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It did not take long for the newest class of U.S.senators to pledge
its allegiance to one of the few trade policies that politicians of both
parties overwhelmingly support. In February, seven of nine newly
elected senators publicly endorsed the Byrd Amendment,a provision
that encourages American companies to ﬁle antidumping lawsuits
by awarding the revenues collected from the resulting tariªs to the
litigating companies. The ostensible purpose of antidumping law
is to help ensure competition by punishing foreign ﬁrms that sell
their products at “unfair”prices in U.S.markets.In practice,however,
antidumping has strayed far from this purpose, becoming little
more than an excuse for special interests to shield themselves from
competition at the expense of both American consumers and other
American companies.
Antidumping is the “third rail” of U.S. trade politics, with few
politicians of either party willing to point out its broadly negative
impact.Antidumping statutes are extremely complex,and few voters
understand how they work and what eªect they have. Advocates of
antidumping measures claim that they guarantee that international
trade is competitive and fair. And who, they ask, could be against
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 fairness? But such rhetoric bears little relation to economic reality.
Rather than promote fairness and competition,the American producers
who petition for antidumping tariªs—a powerful and often unrecog-
nized lobby—use them to thwart foreign competition. In essence,
“antidumping”means little more than “antibargain.”If a foreign ﬁrm
sells its product in the U.S. market at too attractive a price, domestic
ﬁrms can threaten it with an antidumping suit that will lead to hefty
tariªs and higher prices.
What is especially perverse is that the impact of antidumping
tariªs falls most harshly on two groups whose interests members of
Congress should be working to protect: the least well-oª of their
constituents and the vast majority of American producers.All Americans
pay higher prices for food and housing as a result of antidumping
tariªs, but the burden is likely greatest on the poor, because these
necessities make up a larger share of their spending. U.S. producers
are aªected because most items hit with antidumping tariªs are not
ﬁnished goods but components that are used to make other items.
Since 1989, for example, imported ball bearings have been subject to
tariªs ranging above 50 percent. U.S. manufacturers of ball bearings
surely beneﬁt, but there are many more buyers of ball bearings in
the United States than there are producers—and all of them end up
paying signiﬁcantly more than they should and than their foreign
competitors do. Antidumping practice has also become a growing
obstacle for U.S. exporters.
Firms that beneﬁt from antidumping and their allies in Congress
hotly contest any change that weakens antidumping law. Yet for all
their claims that antidumping policy ensures that trade is fair,it is lit-
tle more than an opaque way of protecting favored industries that
have powerful lobbies—doing, in the process, signiﬁcant damage to
everyone else.
going astray
Free trade beneﬁts the world economy by pushing countries to
specialize in the goods and services they produce most e⁄ciently.Just
as a shopper beneﬁts from a sale,each nation beneﬁts from paying less
for products it buys on the world market.Antidumping law was created
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uses temporary low prices to drive its competitors out of a market
and then raises prices, a practice known as “predatory pricing.”
Antidumping statutes purport to defend against this by preventing
the sale of foreign goods “at less than fair value.”
But defending against “predatory pricing”and enforcing “fair value”
as it has come to be understood are two very diªerent things—a
distinction that is crucial for understanding how U.S. trade law has
gone so far astray.As soon as one tries to deﬁne what a “fair”price is,
it quickly becomes apparent that the idea is elusive. In a competitive
system of world trade, where resources are allocated by the invisible
hand of the market and prices are untainted by either government
intervention or the exercise of monopoly power,prices are determined
by supply and demand,and the voluntary nature of commerce ensures
foreign affairs. July /August 2005 [109]
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 that trade beneﬁts both parties. The debate over fair prices begins
with deviations from this ideal: What if a government subsidizes a
particular industry? What if a country has a single large producer that
charges lower prices in more competitive markets and higher prices
in less competitive ones?
Such deviations make prices seem less natural. But do they make
commerce undesirable for either party? Not necessarily. If a country
is a net exporter of a product,high prices are generally good;if a coun-
try is a net importer of a product, low prices are generally good,even
if those prices are the result of practices that might be viewed as
unfair. The notable exception to this rule is a situation in which,
thanks to predatory pricing,lower prices today will reduce competition
in the future. If, to use one of David Ricardo’s examples, a wine
supplier uses lower prices to drive competitors out of business and
new ﬁrms are slow to enter the market, consumers lose out—the
harm of the ensuing higher prices outweighs the initial beneﬁts of
low prices. On the other hand, if the price war lasts long enough or if
the would-be predator is unable to raise prices in the end because
of the entrance of new competitors, consumers are net winners.The
possibility of new ﬁrms entering a market is thus a crucial constraint
on anticompetitive behavior.
The precursor to modern antidumping law was the seminal Sherman
Antitrust Act of 1890.Antitrust laws are intended to protect consumers
from predatory pricing and other forms of anticompetitive behavior
by ﬁrms seeking to establish a monopoly.By the standards of antitrust,
low prices are a problem not when they simply harm other competitors,
but when they threaten to wipe out competition and thereby ultimately
harm consumers. In practice, this situation is rare. Firms usually cut
prices as part of the competitive process, not in an attempt to thwart
it.Thus, to prove that a ﬁrm is seeking a monopoly, it is necessary to
show it has taken actions that do not make business sense apart from
their stiﬂing eªects on competition.
Current U.S. antidumping practice is based on the Antidumping
Act of 1921, which followed the example of a 1904 Canadian law that
allowed the government to block imports sold at “less than fair value.”
(The original target of the Canadian measure was U.S. Steel; as a
result of it,the company was obliged to raise the prices of the materials
N.Gregory Mankiw and Phillip L.Swagel
[110] foreign affairs. Volume 84 No.4it supplied to build Canadian railroads in order to avoid a tariª.) The
Antidumping Act of 1921 adopted this notion of “fair value,”straying
from the idea that antidumping measures were meant strictly to protect
consumers and markets from anticompetitive practices.The act grants
protection from imports as long as a company can prove that a foreign
ﬁrm’s actions are designed to injure or threaten to injure an American
industry.If these conditions are met,the government imposes a tariª
worth the “dumping margin”—the diªerence between the price of
the imported product and its “fair value,”deﬁned as a price above the
cost of production and at least as high as the price charged in the foreign
ﬁrm’s home market.
From an economic standpoint,selling at prices below “fair value”
can be considered normal business practice.If competition in the U.S.
market is ﬁercer than competition in a foreign market,for example,
a foreign ﬁrm might be able to maximize proﬁts by selling its products
in the United States at lower prices than in its home country.Rather
than the result of predatory practices by foreign ﬁrms, lower prices
are often the result of healthy competition; outlawing them denies
American consumers the beneﬁts of such competition. Consider
as well that within the United States ﬁrms are allowed to charge
diªerent prices to diªerent consumers.Movie theaters,for example,
charge an adult more for a ticket than they charge a child, even
though they each take one seat.Likewise,pharmaceutical ﬁrms can
charge more for drugs in high-income countries than they do in
low-income countries.
Predatory pricing is a very diªerent matter,since it harms not only
domestic competitors but, in the long run, American consumers
as well. Unfortunately, U.S. antidumping law has come to ignore
the distinction between the two diªerent kinds of low prices.Since the
Antidumping Act of 1921,there has been no requirement to show that
dumping is predatory; one need only prove that prices are either
below cost or below the price charged for a similar item in a ﬁrm’s
home market.
An unintended consequence of this evolution is that modern
antidumping practice actually facilitates the kind of unfair and anti-
competitive behavior it was intended to prevent. When a group of
ﬁrms in a market tries to act in concert to keep prices high,one check
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undercut them. Allowing domestic ﬁrms to threaten foreign com-
petitors with antidumping action makes it easier for them to keep
prices high.And not only do antidumping tariªs themselves restrict
trade,but investigations into dumping also have a restrictive eªect.
Research by Bruce Blonigen and Thomas Prusa has shown that the
mere threat of antidumping action is a valuable tool for a domestic
ﬁrm trying to impede competition from abroad.
keeping prices high
An investigation of alleged dumping by a foreign ﬁrm typically
proceeds along two concurrent paths.While the Commerce Depart-
ment’s Import Administration investigates whether the imported
product has been sold in the United States at less than fair value,the U.S.
International Trade Commission (itc) investigates whether a domestic
industry has been injured or threatened with injury by the allegedly
dumped imports.If both dumping and injury are established,a tariª
is levied equal to the dumping margin.
These tariªs have a substantial impact on trade, and that impact
has grown considerably in recent years.Antidumping tariªs are often
substantially larger than other kinds of protection. One study found
that antidumping duties are on average 10 to 20 times higher than
normal tariªs. And once imposed, antidumping tariªs are not easily
removed.Although they can be lifted after a “sunset review”that occurs
every ﬁve years, they carry no ﬁxed time limit and therefore tend to
last for considerable periods. The Department of Commerce lifted
tariªs in only two of the 314 cases it reviewed between 1998 and 2000.
Recently,the increased use of discretion by Department of Commerce
staª in calculating dumping margins has led to an increase in anti-
dumping tariªs—an increase that has nearly reversed reductions
in dumping margins resulting from rule changes agreed to by Wash-
ington in 1995 during the Uruguay Round of international trade talks.
These antidumping measures do considerable harm to both
American consumers and American business. Research by Michael
Gallaway,Bruce Blonigen,and Joseph Flynn found that in 1993 anti-
dumping and antisubsidy tariªs (the latter are meant to counteract
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($5 billion in today’s prices), with most of the harm caused by anti-
dumping tariªs, which outnumber antisubsidy measures by more
than three to one.Since then,the economic cost of antidumping laws
has likely increased.Although average antidumping tariªs have fallen
somewhat since 1993,from 50.6 percent between 1991 and 1993 to 41.9
percent between 1997 and 1999, the value of imports aªected has
increased substantially.Some $14 billion worth of imports were covered
by antidumping tariªs approved between 1994 and 2003, up from
$8.34 billion between 1984 and 1993.
Most antidumping tariªs are levied on components used in the
production of other goods rather than on items sold directly to con-
sumers. As a result, “downstream” ﬁrms using the aªected items as
production inputs face higher costs. U.S. automakers, for example,
must pay more for steel, making their cars
less competitive against imports.This is the
case even if they use no imported steel,since
domestic steel ﬁrms can raise prices behind
the antidumping barrier. In some cases, the
impact is large enough to cause American
ﬁrms to shift jobs out of the United States.
Antidumping tariªs of 62.7 percent imposed
in 1991 on ﬂat-panel displays prompted U.S. companies to shift pro-
duction of notebook computers from the United States to Asia,since
imports of whole computers did not face the punitive tariª.Toshiba
closed a California production facility to open one in Japan, and
Apple Computer set up a facility in Ireland rather than stick to its
original plan of assembling laptops in Colorado.
The U.S. steel industry has long been the leading user of anti-
dumping procedures: nearly half of antidumping tariªs imposed
since 1970 have been on steel imports,and 158 of the 294 antidumping
orders in force as of April 2005 were on steel products. Such tariªs
continue despite strong performance by U.S.steel ﬁrms and a 45 percent
jump in steel prices between December 2003 and March 2005.These
higher steel prices help steel producers,but they hurt the much larger
number of ﬁrms and workers that use steel.Whereas steel producers
employed just under 160,000 workers in early 2005,more than 1.5 million
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Each job saved by 
steel tariffs came at the
cost of three jobs in
steel-using industries.
 employees worked at ﬁrms that manufacture metal products,more than
1.1 million at ﬁrms that manufacture machinery,and nearly 1.8 million
at ﬁrms that produce transportation equipment such as cars and parts.
One recent study found that each job saved by steel tariªs came at
the cost of three jobs in steel-using industries and caused economic
distortions equal to some $450,000.
Foreign ﬁrms also use U.S.antidumping laws to inhibit competition.
In late 2003, imports of Chinese television sets 21 inches and larger
were hit with antidumping tariªs of up to 78 percent (5 to 26 percent
for most ﬁrms) as a result of a case ﬁled by U.S.companies that assemble
televisions on behalf of Japanese and Korean television manufacturers.
These tariªs exclude newer digital models,aªecting instead the lower-
end televisions sold mainly in discount stores.
The total eªect of antidumping laws probably surpasses these visible
costs,because the mere existence of such laws causes ﬁrms to change
their behavior in ways that are not easily measured.Just knowing that
lower prices might trigger antidumping tariªs can lead foreign ﬁrms
to charge higher prices than they might otherwise in order to reduce
the risk of becoming entangled in trade lawsuits.In some cases,anti-
dumping suits are resolved by “suspension agreements,”under which
foreign ﬁrms agree to minimum prices for goods they export to the
United States.It is no small irony that the Department of Commerce
sets prices in this fashion for steel plates imported into the United
States from the former Soviet Union.
Antidumping tariªs change over time in ways that cause additional
economic harm. After the dumping margin is calculated, foreign
ﬁrms are allowed to ask for the duties to be adjusted through periodic
administrative reviews that take into account any recent price increases.
In theory,they can even request that the antidumping tariªs be removed
after showing that import prices have risen by the same amount as the
tariª. If they win, consumers face the same bottom-line price, but
the U.S.Treasury no longer collects the tariª revenue.Instead,it goes
to the foreign ﬁrm in the guise of a higher price.In reality,antidumping
tariªs are computed so as to make it impossible for foreign ﬁrms to
raise prices by an amount that precisely oªsets the tariªs.Nonetheless,
research has found that about half of the economic harm caused by
antidumping laws stems from the impact of foreign ﬁrms raising prices
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of lower prices and the U.S. government of the associated tariª
revenues.(The other half of the harm results from market distortions,
as users of the goods aªected by tariªs change their behavior in response
to the higher prices.)
absurdities
The harm to U.S. consumers and producers from antidumping law
goes well beyond higher prices.U.S.exporters are increasingly hampered
by the use of antidumping actions in the rest of the world. Moreover,
antidumping policies have become a point of contention in international
trade negotiations, threatening to undermine the mission of the World
Trade Organization (wto) and the overall expansion of free trade.
Although the United States and the European Union initiate
the largest number of antidumping suits, developing countries are
now the heaviest users of antidumping measures per dollar of imports.
Argentina,Brazil,India,and South Africa use antidumping laws 5 to
20 times more often than the United States does.Over the last decade,
only Chinese and South Korean ﬁrms have been accused of dumping
more than U.S. ﬁrms.
Not coincidentally, American exporters face dumping charges in
many of the markets where they have been most successful. Mexico
has initiated six antidumping investigations against U.S. exports in
the last year, often targeting agricultural products, including ham,
beef, rice, and apples. U.S. exports to China have been growing at
roughly 30 percent per year, and the number of antidumping cases
ﬁled against U.S.ﬁrms there has grown even faster.Some $286 million
in U.S.exports were subject to Chinese antidumping actions in 2003,
up 65 percent from 2002. The vast majority of these cases involve
chemical products, with supposed dumping margins ranging from
7 to 112 percent. Research by Thomas Prusa and Susan Skeath has
found that the increase in antidumping allegations is motivated, at
least in part, by a desire for retaliation against U.S. antidumping
actions, not by a change in the trading practices of U.S. exporters.
Recent antidumping tariªs applied to U.S.chicken exports to South
Africa illustrate the frequent absurdity of the proceedings. Chicken
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eaters in the United States prefer white meat;chicken eaters in South
Africa prefer dark meat. Since chickens come with both white and
dark, this would seem to present an ideal opportunity for trade. In
1999, however, the South African Board of Tariªs and Trade (btt)
initiated an antidumping case against U.S.chicken exporters for selling
below fair value. The btt approached the question of fair value by
comparing the sales price of exports to the computed costs of production
(a method that has become increasingly common in recent years).But
how to determine the cost of producing dark chicken meat versus the
cost of producing white chicken meat? Since a “scientiﬁc” approach
to this question is impossible,the U.S.exporters oªered one calculation
of the cost of producing dark meat while the btt used another. In the
end,the btt judged that the two U.S.exporters involved were dumping
dark meat by margins of 209 percent and 357 percent. As a result, U.S.
exports of poultry to South Africa fell to a mere $307,000 in 2001,a de-
cline of 80 percent from the previous year.These duties remain in force.
Antidumping has also become an increasingly frequent subject of
wto disputes,and the United States has fought vigorously to preserve
its right to use antidumping policies. Although trade agreements
oªer general guidelines for acceptable antidumping practices, wto
members implement them very diªerently.One ongoing dispute con-
cerns the U.S.practice of “zeroing,”which allows o⁄cials to disregard
instances in which foreign ﬁrms charge prices over fair value, thus
oªsetting supposed instances of undercharging.Consider,for example,
a foreign ﬁrm that sells a product in its home and U.S. markets. Six
months a year,the ﬁrm charges $10 in its home market and $8 in the
United States;the other six months a year,it charges $8 at home and
$10 in the United States.On average,the ﬁrm charges $9 both overseas
and in the United States.But under zeroing,a U.S.o⁄cial can deﬁne
this as dumping, with each sale in the ﬁrst half of the year assigned a
dumping margin of $2 and each sale in the second assigned a dumping
margin of zero (rather than -$2). Instead of letting the overpricing
oªset the underpricing, which would mean no tariª, the average
dumping margin—and the resulting tariª—is $1.Europe’s version of
zeroing was recently found to be contrary to its wtoobligations.The
U.S. government has asserted that its version diªers from the Euro-
peans’ and is attempting to defend its practice before the wto. Thewto is unlikely to accept Washington’s defense,hinting at yet another
defeat for the United States in the wto dispute process.
Another dispute before the wto involves the Byrd Amendment.
The provision,ﬁrst proposed as the Continued Dumping and Subsidy
Oªset Act, became law when it was attached to appropriations legis-
lation in 2000.Even while signing the measure,President Bill Clinton
noted that it was contrary to U.S. obligations at the wto and called
for its quick repeal.
U.S.antidumping law requires that a ﬁling must have the support
of a signiﬁcant portion of the domestic industry in question, and the
Byrd Amendment gives all ﬁrms in the industry a ﬁnancial incentive
to support a case by determining that a ﬁrm only receives a share of
the collected tariªs if it backs the initial ﬁling.It also gives petitioning
industries a double serving of federal assistance: they beneﬁt ﬁrst
from the increase in prices when antidumping tariªs are applied and
then from a subsidy when the revenues are distributed.Through 2004,
payments under the Byrd Amendment totaled more than $1 billion,
and the Congressional Budget O⁄ce estimates that such payments
will exceed $5 billion between 2005 and 2015.
A wto panel ruled against the Byrd Amendment in September
2002, allowing countries in the European Union and several other
nations to apply retaliatory tariªs against U.S. exports.The decision
was upheld on appeal in January 2003.The Bush administration has
repeatedly called for the Byrd Amendment to be repealed, but
Congress has so far failed to act.In the meantime,the retaliatory tariªs
took eªect in May.
a better way
Addressing the excesses of antidumping policy could well play a
critical role in the Doha Development Agenda talks now being
conducted under the auspices of the wto. Outright repeal of U.S.
antidumping laws would certainly be the best policy for the United
States’ well-being, but it is politically infeasible. The Trade Act of
2002, which granted trade promotion authority to the president,
requires that he provide Congress with at least 180 days advance notice
before signing a trade agreement that aªects U.S. antidumping law
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the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws,”
including antidumping and other laws regulating unfair trade.
A second-best compromise that recognizes these political constraints
could still improve on current trade law.Antidumping has two objectives:
to protect U.S.ﬁrms against predatory pricing and to give them time to
adjust to new levels of competition.Today’s policy is not well suited
to either goal. Fortunately, there are better ways to meet both.To be
sure,free trade remains the ideal,but the best should not become the
enemy of the good in designing and implementing trade policy.
Concerns about predatory pricing could be met by revising anti-
dumping law to address the antitrust concerns that inspired it.
Government should be able to protect against those rare instances
when a foreign ﬁrm does approach the U.S. market with the intent
of establishing a monopoly.But it does not need current antidumping
law to do so;this can be eªectively achieved by giving the Department
of Justice an enhanced role in antidumping proceedings and reducing
the role of the Department of Commerce.
A better way to protect industries adjusting to increased competition
would be through the increased use of “safeguard tariªs,” a type of
trade barrier that is explicitly temporary. Increased use of safeguards
may fall short of the free-trade ideal, but they cost the U.S. economy
far less than do antidumping tariªs. (When tariªs are in place for
more than three years, the wto allows countries whose exports are
aªected by the safeguards to levy retaliatory tariªs.) Like antidumping
duties, safeguards can be put in place only if the itc determines that
speciﬁc imports are hurting a domestic industry.The legal hurdle for
getting a safeguard, however, is higher: unlike antidumping tariªs,
which can be levied when imports merely cause material injury, safe-
guards are permissible only when the itc ﬁnds that no other factor is
more important than imports in causing harm to a U.S. industry.
In return for the higher standard of injury with safeguards, import-
competing ﬁrms in the United States do not have to show that the
foreign ﬁrms took any particular actions. No consideration is given
in safeguard determinations as to whether trade is fair or unfair.
The law governing safeguard tariªs also gives the president an
opportunity to balance the needs of the import-competing community
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a recommendation,the president,according to the legislation,has the
discretion to impose trade barriers as he sees ﬁt,balancing “the short-
and long-term economic and social costs”of the safeguard tariªs with
“other factors related to the national economic interest of the United
States.” And in return for trade barriers, the domestic industry must
put forward a plan for adjustment and show progress in making
the adjustment—or face the prospect of having the safeguard tariªs
removed by presidential action.
Proponents of antidumping measures frequently point to the hostile
reception safeguard actions have received at the wto.A series of wto
rulings has indeed made it di⁄cult for the itc to ﬁnd that imports
hurt an American industry at least as much as any other cause. A
useful negotiating goal in the Doha negotiations would be to clarify
the rules governing safeguards in the wto so as to facilitate their
temporary use.Meanwhile,Washington should amend the admin-
istrative procedures to remove zeroing, rather than wait for a wto
panel to force the issue. Such a move would reduce dumping mar-
gins and avert another U.S. defeat at the wto. Each such loss is a
blow to public and congressional support for an institution that is
a powerful force for improving global economic conditions and
promoting international cooperation.
In international trade negotiations, a government will typically
oªer as “concessions” actions that are economically desirable but
politically di⁄cult at home.In a sense,each party in a trade negotiation
uses the need to make concessions to the other side as an excuse to
undertake actions that, absent politics, it should be willing to make
on its own. The U.S. economy has beneﬁted enormously from the
liberalization it has “conceded to” in decades of trade negotiations.
Any move to limit the use of antidumping policy would certainly be
cast as a major concession as well. It is a concession Washington
should be eager to make.Such a change would oªer great beneﬁts to
both American consumers and American producers and pave the way
for a return to antidumping’s original purpose: ensuring rather than
restricting competition.∂
Antidumping:The Third Rail of Trade Policy
foreign affairs. July/August 2005 [119]